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COMMENT
ENDURING THE REIGN OF TWEEDLEDEE
AND TWEEDLEDUM:1
How THE COURT FURTHER ENTRENCHED
AMERICA'S TWO-PARTY DUOPOLY IN
ARKANSAS EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION
COMMISSION V. FORBES2 AND How IT
CAN BE DREDGED OUT
"[Olne who excels at warfare first establishes him-
self in a position where he cannot be defeated." 3.
It is not known whether Republican and Democratic strategists
have been studying Sun-Tzu. For all practical purposes, though, their
stranglehold on the American political process mirrors the celebrated
tactician's above-quoted admonition. It remains to be seen whether
the U.S. Supreme Court is content with this status quo. Despite in-
dulging, on occasion, in glowing prose about the manifold benefits
that third parties bestow on the American political scene,4 the Court
has always tethered such enthusiasm to warnings about what would
befall the Republic if the stability of the two-party system were im-
periled.5 The inherent tension between the increasing prominence of
1 "Two persons or things nominally different, but practically the same; a nearly identical
pair." WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
2041 (1996). Also, characters popularized in LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND
(Schocken 1978) (1869).
2 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998).3 Sun-Tzu, The Art of War, in THE SEVEN MILITARY CLASSICS OF ANCIENT CHINA 145,
164 (Ralph D. Sawyer trans., 1993).
4 See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,794 (1983) ("Historically [sic] political
figures outside the two major parties have fertile sources of new ideas and new programs; many
of their challenges to the status quo have in time made their way into the political main-
stream.").
5 See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 117 S. Ct. 1364, 1374 (1997) ("[P]olitical
stability is best served through a healthy two-party system."); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724,
736 (1974) ("[Slplintered parties and unrestrained factionalism may do significant damage to
the fabric of government.").
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third parties and the implicit threat they pose to the Republi-
can/Democrat political duopoly has forced the Court to consider the
wisdom of sanctioning greater electoral accessibility to independents.
The Court has already allowed limits on third parties' right to receive
federal campaign funds6 and their right to appear on the ballot.7
The most recent question facing the Court concerned third par-
ties' right of access to a state-sponsored candidate debate on public
television.8 A split between federal appellate courts prompted the
Court to hear the case.9 This latest dilemma pitted the right of third
party candidates to engage in rhetorical electioneering on public air-
waves versus the right of public broadcasting programmers to choose
who may debate.
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court erred in Forbes.
While the Court properly applied its First Amendment "forum" doc-
trine, it failed utterly by not laying down guidelines to check the dis-
cretion of public broadcasting programmers in future debates. That
this decision will not bode well for those voters who like a choice
other than bland and tasteless is incontestable. Thus, it is now up to
state legislatures or Congress take the initiative and expand the elec-
toral menu.
I. BACKGROUND
Ralph Forbes ran as an independent candidate in 1992 for Ar-
kansas' Third Congressional District.'0 Forbes was no stranger to
6 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (requiring allocation of campaign subsidies to
be governed by pre-established and objective criteria).
7 See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971) ("There is surely an important state
interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before
printing the name of a political organization's candidate on the ballot."); Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23 (1968) (holding that a candidate was entitled to a spot on the ballot after showing a
minimal level of electoral support). But cf Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1375 (cautioning that the
state may not "completely insulate the two party system from minor parties' or independent
candidates' competition and influence," but may do so to preserve political stability).
8 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998).
9 See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n Network Found., 93 F.3d 497 (8th
Cir. 1996) (granting right of access to state-sponsored debate under First Amendment grounds
to all ballot qualified candidates); Chandler v. Georgia Public Telecomm. Comm'n, 917 F.2d
486 (1 lth Cir. 1990) (holding exclusion of third party candidate from state-sponsored debate did
not violate First Amendment).
10 Forbes' party affiliation in this election was unclear. News media consistently reported
him as an independent. In 1985, he was with the Populist Party. Currently, he is running under
the Reform Party banner. See Andrew Arnold, First Amendment Hit by Supreme Court, THE
SPOTLIGHT, June 15, 1998, at 3. Forbes is a self-described "Christian supremacist" and a for-
mer member of the American Nazi Party. See Editorial: Public Broadcasters Must Exercise
Editorial Control, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 21, 1998, at A18, available in Westlaw,
1998 WL 4294761.
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campaigns for political office." In August of 1992, Forbes obtained
the 2,000 signatures necessary to qualify under Arkansas' ballot ac-
cess law. 2 He then endeavored to gain entrance to a candidate debate
sponsored by the Arkansas Educational Television Commission
(AETC). The AETC had already invited the Republican and Demo-
cratic candidates, but refrained from extending the same courtesy to
Forbes, based on its opinion that this decision was in the best interests
of its viewing public.
1 3
In October of 1992, Forbes filed suit in federal district court for
injunctive and declaratory relief on First Amendment and statutory
grounds. 4 The court dismissed Forbes' suit for failure to state a
claim. The Eighth Circuit, however, while affirming the dismissal of
the statutory claims, 5 reversed on the First Amendment issue. The
court found that Forbes had "a qualified right of access created by
[AETC's] sponsorship of a debate,"' 6 because AETC was a state ac-
tor. 7 As such, AETC could only exclude Forbes if it could proffer
reasons "strong enough to survive First Amendment scrutiny."' 8 The
court determined that a public forum of some sort had been created,
but remanded to the factfinder to ascertain which kind of forum it
was, and whether AETC's as-yet-unarticulated reasons could pass
constitutional muster.'9
On remand, a jury found that Forbes' exclusion "was not the re-
sult of political pressure, and that it was not based on opposition to-
' In 1990, running for Lieutenant Governor as a Republican, Forbes captured 46.8% of
the vote in the primary, winning 15 of 16 counties statewide. See Jamin Raskin, Let the Little
Guy Have His Day on TV, WASHINGTON TIMES, October 8, 1997, at A19, available in Westlaw,
1997 WL 3685838.
12 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-7-103(c)(1) (Michie 1993).
13 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1638 (AETC al-
leged that it had "made a bona fide journalistic judgement that our viewers would be best served
by limiting the debate" to the major party candidates.).
14 See id. Aside from his claim for being excluded from the debate, Forbes charged that
an anti-abortion ad sold to private television stations was wrongly run during "safe harbor"
hours without an official finding that the ad was "indecent," and that his exclusion from the
debate violated the "equal time" provisions of 47 ,U.S.C. § 315. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ.
Television Comm'n Network Found., 22 F.3d 1423, 1425 (8th Cir. 1994).
15 See Forbes, 22 F.3d at 1427. Specifically, the court found there was no private cause of
action under 47 U.S.C. § 315 and that Forbes had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
before the FCC. Similarly, his equal time claim under the same statute was barred. Id.
,6 Id. at 1428.
17 See UL This overruled the portion of DeYoung v. Patten, 898 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1990),
which held that no First Amendment right to appear in a public debate existed beyond that pro-
vided in 47 U.S.C. § 315. Otherwise, with no chance for private relief, states could make view-
point based exclusions with impunity.
' Forbes, 22 F.3d at 1428.
19 See id. at 1430. AETC had not yet filed its answer to Forbes' complaint.
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wards plaintiffs political opinions."2  As a matter of law, the district
court held "that the debate in question was a non-public forum.
21
Forbes again appealed and again the Eighth Circuit reversed. The
appellate court was especially displeased with the district court's han-
dling of the forum issue. The main issue for the Eighth Circuit was
whether the station's reasons for exclusion were constitutionally
sound. By deciding as a matter of law that the forum was non-public,
the district court had removed the real issue from the jury.22
The Eighth Circuit deemed that it was required to conduct an in-
dependent review. In so doing, the court determined that AETC's
debate was "without reservation" a limited public forum.23 The court
then went on to assail "the legal sufficiency of the reason given for
the exclusion,"' which it found wanting. This time AETC appealed,
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court approached the issues in the same manner as
the Eighth Circuit. The Court first analyzed the public forum doc-
trine's applicability, and then decided if AETC's reasons for exclud-
ing Forbes were constitutionally permissible. Unfortunately for
Forbes, but not for the reigning duopoly, the Court disagreed with the
Eighth Circuit.
II. FORUM ANALYSIS: WHERE THE CouRi WAS RIGHT
A. Not a Forum at All?
Opponents of the Eighth Circuit's decision took issue with the
very notion of applying public forum analysis to government-
sponsored public broadcasters. They made two primary arguments
against the application of forum analysis: that the government itself
was the speaker and that the principle of stare decisis should be fol-
lowed.
The first argument urged that the government itself was the
speaker and was not opening a public forum. 25 Under this reasoning,
20 Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n Network Found., 93 F.3d 497, 499 (8th
Cir. 1996).
21 Id. at 500.
22 See id. at 502. AETC argued that Bose Corp. v. Consumer's Union, 466 U.S. 485
(1984), compelled this result. The Eighth Circuit disagreed, approaching the forum issue as a
mixed question of fact and law, resolved "by applying legal principles to facts" and more prop-
erly before a jury. See Forbes, 93 F.3d at 502.
23 See id. at 504.
24 id.
25 See Amicus Brief of the State of California, et al., Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n
v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998), available in Westlaw, 1997 WL 311451. In particular, the
states urged that "[w]here government utilizes outside speakers to help present a public broad-
cast program, it is itself speaking and not opening a forum." Id. at *3.
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the government acts as an editor and "may fully regulate the content
of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists
private entities to convey its own message. 2 6  The candidates are
simply "incidental beneficiaries,"'27 while the "intended beneficiary
... is the viewing audience, not the candidates."28
The second argument, built on precedent, asserted that public fo-
rum analysis is inapplicable to a government-licensed station's pro-
gramming determinations, under both FCC regulations29 and federal
appellate case law.30 As with the first contention, the second also
came down to an infringement on the state-entity station's editorial
discretion; namely, "the broadcast licensee exercising sole program-
ming authority.")31
Mindful of the public broadcasters' need for editorial discretion,
the Court accepted that, "in most cases, the First Amendment of its
own force does not compel public broadcasters to allow third parties
access to their programming."32 However, realizing that acceptance
of these arguments, especially the first, would necessarily imply the
government's rejection of candidates that it excluded from a debate,
the Court held that "candidate debates present the narrow exception to
the rule., 33  Candidate debates are unlike other programs, because
they open "by design a forum for political speech '34 and assume a
place "of exceptional significance in the electoral process."35 Finding
that the "debate was a forum of some type,, 36 the Court next turned to
the issue of determining the nature of the forum.
26 at *5.
27 Id. at *6.28 id. at*5.
29 See Mississippi Auth. for Educ. Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 1296, 1303 n.12 (1979); City
of New York Municipal Broadcasting System, 56 F.C.C.2d 169, 170 (1975).
30 See, e.g., Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1043 (5th Cir.
1982) (holding that the station is "by definition... not a 'public forum"' and an excluded
speaker "is without grounds for challenge under the public forum doctrine").
31 1d. at 1042.
3 2 Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1640 (1998).
33 Id. An additional problem with the first argument is that it makes the forum the station,
when it is really the debate. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc.,
473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985) ("[F]orum analysis is not completed merely by identifying the gov-
ernment property at issue. Rather, in defining the forum we have focused on the access sought
by the speaker... In cases in which limited access is sought, our cases have taken a more tai-
lored approach to ascertaining the perimeters of a forum within the confines of the government
property.") (emphasis added).
34 Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1640.
35 id.
36Id. at 1641.
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B. Traditional Public Fora
Historically, the Court has recognized "three types of fora: the
traditional public forum, the public forum created by government
designation, and the non-public forum. 37
The traditional public forum designation, characterized "by long
tradition or by government fiat" as a site for "assembly and debate,"3
was rejected by both AETC and Forbes." The Court agreed, noting
that it had already jettisoned the idea of expanding the traditional
public forum "beyond its historic confines,"4 and citing the incom-
patibility of "the programming dictates a television broadcaster must
follow" with the traditional public forum's practically unconstrained
right of access.4'
C. Designated Public Fora
The Court next considered whether AETC's sponsorship of a
candidate debate created a designated public forum, a proposition ad-
hered to by the Eighth Circuit. A designated public forum is created
by deliberate governmental action "intentionally opening a nontradi-
tional public forum for public discourse."4 This focus on intent pro-
vides the government the option to establish a limited public forum or
a nonpublic forum.43 The appellate court believed that a limited public
forum is born where the government "does not itself speak or subsi-
dize transmittal of a message it favors but instead... encourage[s] a
diversity of views from private speakers."'  In support, the Eighth
Circuit recited "a number of instances" where the Court found a des-
ignated public forum.45 Focusing in particular on the Court's Widmar
v. Vincent 6 decision, the appellate court paralleled the opening of a
university's facilities to registered student groups for expressive
speech purposes to AETC's opening of "its facilities to a particular
37 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; see also G. Sidney Buchanan, The Case of the Vanishing
Public Forum, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 949, 950-51 (proposing an alternative test to avoid con-
tinuing Court deference to the government's asserted reasons for exclusion).
38 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (finding in-
ternal school mail system was nonpublic forum).
39 See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1641.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
43 "[W]hen the Government acts as the holder of public property other than streets, parks,
and similar places, the Government may do whatever it reasonably intends to do, so long as it
does not intend to suppress a particular viewpoint." Id. at 814 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (re-
counting the majority's holding).
44 Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n Network Found., 93 F.3d 497, 503 (8th
Cir. 1996) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819,
834 (1995)).
45 Id. (internal citations omitted).
46 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
[Vol. 49:257
AETC v. FORBES
group-candidates running for the Third District Congressional
seat." This debate was "staged in order for the candidates to express
their views on campaign issues, 48 unlike other forums opened selec-
tively to speakers on an individual basis.49 The candidates constituted
a limited class and, as such, every candidate legally qualified as a
member of said class should be included in the debate.5
The Court objected to what it saw as the Eighth Circuit's misuse
of precedent. In Widmar, the Court stated, the government created a
designated public forum because it allowed general access to a class
of speakers; AETC, however, allowed only "selective access for indi-
vidual speakers.""1 Individuals belonging to the student groups in
Widmar were not required to ask permission when they sought to
speak since the policy of the state actor "intended to designate a place
not traditionally open to assembly and debate as a public forum.,
52
Thus, it was "property that the State has opened for expressive activ-
ity by all or part of the public.
53
While the Eighth Circuit correctly pegged the debate as a forum
opened to a class of speakers, it failed to differentiate the access re-
quirements involved-what the Court dubs the "Cornelius distinction
between general and selective access."'54 For the Court, AETC did
"no more than reserve eligibility for access to the forum to a particu-
lar class of speakers, whose members must then, as individuals, 'ob-
tain permission."'' 55 Contrary to the appellate court's position, the de-
bate was not generally open to all candidates, but was left to AETC to
make "candidate-by-candidate determinations as to which of the eli-
gible candidates would participate in the debate. '56 This did not give
rise to a limited public forum.
57
47 Forbes, 93 F.3d at 504.
48 d.49 See iL The Eighth Circuit distinguished Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (finding expressive activity incidental to reason for opening forum)
and Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (granting access to
groups on individual basis).
50 The appellate court struck at the root of the problem in pronouncing on this issue:
"Surely government cannot, simply by its own ipse dixit, define a class of speakers so as to
exclude a person who would naturally be expected to be a member of the class on no basis other
than party affiliation." Forbes, 93 F.3d at 504.
51 Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1642 (1998). "The
State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its
control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated." Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47
(1966) (holding shopping center was not dedicated to public use).
52 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
53 International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) (al-
lowing restrictions on speech in airport setting).
54 See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1642.55 Id at 1642 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804).
56 Id. at 1642-43.
57 See id. at 1643. "Such selective access, unsupported by evidence of a purposeful desig-
nation for public use, does not create a public forum." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 805.
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D. Nonpublic Fora
Having determined that the debate was a forum of some kind and
not a traditional or designated one, the Court decided that it was a
nonpublic forums 8 Yet christening a forum nonpublic "does not mean
that the government can restrict speech in whatever way it likes."' 9 To
justify its exclusion of Forbes, the Court would require AETC to prof-
fer some objective, viewpoint-neutral explanation. By analyzing
AETC's arguments, it becomes manifestly obvious where the Court
erred in its analysis and equally apparent how it could be put right.
1I. RATIONALIZING EXCLUSION: WHERE THE COURT WENT AwRY
A. AETC's Criteria for Exclusion
1. What the Court Stomached...
Despite the classification of the debate as a nonpublic forum,
AETC was still required to proffer objective, viewpoint-neutral ex-
planations for why it excluded Forbes.6" AETC's editorial staff testi-
fied that Forbes was excluded because (1) Arkansas voters and the
news media did not take him seriously, (2) major voting results re-
porting services did not plan to run his name or his vote tally on elec-
tion night, (3) he had minimal financial support and (4) his campaign
headquarters were located at his home. 61 The Court relied heavily on
the jury's "express finding" that AETC acted "in good faith" and that
its decision was not politically motivated,6' but rather was based on
58 See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1643; Buchanan, supra note 37, at 952 ("[A] 'nonpublic fo-
rum' is a governmentally controlled forum that is neither a traditional public forum nor a desig-
nated public forum.").59 International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 687 (1992).
60 See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1643 ("To be consistent with the First Amendment, the exclu-
sion of a speaker from a nonpublic forum must not be based on the speaker's viewpoint and
must otherwise be reasonable in light of the purpose of the property.").
61 See id. at 1643-44. In summing up AETC's rationale the Court combined the concepts
of "political viability," offered as justification on the appellate level, and "newsworthiness," an
explanation offered primarily before the Court. The final two justifications for excluding Forbes
were especially hypocritical. In Arkansas' Second Congressional District, the same year Forbes
was excluded from the Third District debate based on insufficient financing, the Republican
contender was invited, even though Forbes raised over 90% more money than the Republican.
See Amicus Brief of Perot '96, Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633
(1998), available in Westlaw, 1997 WL 361877, at *12. Furthermore, that the operation of
Forbes' campaign headquarters out of his home somehow disqualified him is nonsensical. Many
candidates of limited means function in this manner. Even John F. Kennedy conducted his
presidential campaigns out of his home. See id. at *13 n.14.62 Id. at 1644.
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Forbes' status.6 Thus, Forbes' "own objective lack of support, not
his platform," resulted in his rejection from the debate panel.'
The Court conveniently glossed over the fact that these "were
employees of government 6' deciding that "the voters lacked interest
in [Forbes'] candidacy." 66  This confidence in governmental good
faith, in a decade that has recorded innumerable abuses by govern-
ment,67 strikes one as rather naive.68  Such a surfeit of faith in gov-
ernment will inevitably lead to the very "manipulation of the political
process" that the Court claims did not occur here.69 This will happen
whether the Court wants to acknowledge it or not; pretending the sun
does not exist will not prevent sunburn to anyone exposed overlong
before it.
2 .... The Dissent and the Eighth Circuit Could Not
As Justice Stevens' dissent points out, Forbes' exclusion was
preordained: "Two months before Forbes was officially certified as
an independent candidate.., the AETC staff had already concluded
that he 'should not be invited."' 7 ° AETC's claims to objectivity not-
withstanding, Stevens correctly notes the "standardless character of
the decision to exclude Forbes."' The real issue for Stevens, as it
was for the Eighth Circuit, was not what type of forum AETC had
created, "but whether AETC defined the contours of the debate forum
with sufficient specificity to justify the exclusion of a ballot-qualified
63 See id. See also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49
(1983) (holding that excluding a speaker based on status is permissible).
6' Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1644. The Eighth Circuit dismissed AETC's reasons under the
stricter test for a designated public forum. As will be seen, however, those same reasons would
not have passed the more lenient, objective standard used by the Court. See Forbes v. Arkansas
Educ. Television Comm'n Network Found., 93 F.3d 497,505 (8th Cir. 1996).
65 Forbes, 93 F.3d at 505.
66 Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1644; see also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,798 (1983)
("A State's claim that it is enhancing the ability of its citizenry to make wise decisions by re-
stricting the flow of information to them must be viewed with some skepticism.").
"7 See, e.g., Editorial: Government Abused Power at Waco, Ruby Ridge, PEORIA
JOURNAL STAR, October 2, 1997, at A4, available in Westlaw, 1997 WL 7678009 (detailing.
federal atrocities against American citizens); David E. Rosenbaum, Internal Audit Confirms
Abusive IRS Practices, N.Y. TIMES, January 14, 1998, at Al, available in Westlaw, 1998 WL
5393499 (documenting the Internal Revenue Service's admitted maltreatment of Americans);
George Krau, Is Feds Motto 'Do As We Say, Not As We Do'? NATL L.J., March 2, 1998, at A24
(reporting how unconstitutional rules of engagement were used to justify the murder of Vicki
Weaver at Ruby Ridge).
68 Even if this faith could be chalked up to credence in the jury that decided that AETC
acted in good faith, it is still misplaced in the constitutional context. "First Amendment ques-
tions of 'constitutional fact' compel this Court's de novo review." Bose Corporation v. Con-
sumer's Union, 466 U.S. 485, 508 n.27 (1984) (calling for an independent review where there
are mixed questions of fact and law).69 Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1644.
70 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71ld.
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candidate."'72 It is clear that AETC did not, whether AETC stands by
its "newsworthiness" criteria, which it admits is subjective,"3 or its
"political viability" criteria, which is equally subjective.14
Stevens' assertion that the majority is allowing public broadcast-
ers unlimited discretion to impose a prior restraint on speech is, un-
fortunately, a bald overstatement of the case."5 It is incorrect to liken
AETC's control over who appears in the debate to a comparable gov-
ernment official determining who may receive a permit to utilize
public facilities. AETC opened a nonpublic forum and therefore was
not required to adhere to the higher standards imposed on those
opening traditional or limited public fora."6 This does not mean that
any standard will suffice-it still must be unambiguous." Despite
only being required to meet the lesser standard, it is still crucial that
AETC be restricted by some prefabricated guidelines."8 Determining
what these criteria will be and how best to implement them fairly will
now be addressed.
B. In Search of a Fair Test
In divining a fair test for exclusion from a state-sponsored televi-
sion debate, there are two principles at odds-the need for free flow-
ing political dialogue versus the station's need to control the debate's
parameters. The Court's permissive acceptance of AETC's proffered
rationale for the exclusion of Forbes tips the balance too far in favor
of broadcasters. Overreaching editorial discretion poses a great threat
72 Id. at 1647.
73 See id. at 1648 (attacking AETC's "subjective judgment" in determining the issue).
AETC admitted that its criteria was "essentially subjective." Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Televi-
sion Comm'n Network Found., 93 F.3d 497,504 (8th Cir. 1996). Although this confession came
about in regards to AETC's decision on political viability, it mainly centered on its criteria in
deciding two months prior to the election that Forbes was not newsworthy. "[A] judgment that
[a candidate's] views are not newsworthy... 'is in reality a fagade for viewpoint discrimina-
tion."' Chandler v. Georgia Public Telecomm. Comm'n, 917 F.2d 486, 493 (11th Cir. 1990)
(Clark, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
74 See Forbes, 93 F.3d at 505 ("[P]olitical viability is, indeed, so subjective, so arguable,
so susceptible of variation in individual opinion, as to provide no secure basis for the exercise of
governmental power consistent with the First Amendment.").
75 See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1647 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lakewood v. Plain Dealer
Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 763 (1988) ("[The risk of viewpoint-based censorship is] at its zenith
when the determination of who may speak and who may not is left to the unbridled decision of a
government official.").
76 The Court uses strict scrutiny to review restrictions in traditional and limited public
fora. See Buchanan, supra note 37, at 953-54.
77 See, e.g., Families Achieving Independence and Respect v. Nebraska Department of
Social Services, 91 F.3d 1076, 1079 (8th Cir. 1996) (vague standard inadequate to justify exclu-
sion from nonpublic forum); Multimedia Publications v. Greenville-Spartanburg Airport, 991
F.2d 154, 159 (4th Cir. 1993) (striking down ban on newsracks in nonpublic forum for lack of
persuasive reasons).
71 See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1648 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (lamenting that "[n]o written
criteria cabined the discretion of the AETC staff').
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to the First Amendment values implicated in the political debate set-
ting.
79
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, noted that private television net-
works, under the same set of facts at issue, "would be subject to scru-
tiny under the Federal Election Campaign Act unless the network
used 'pre-established objective criteria to determine which candidates
may participate in [the] debate.""'8 Even the Court majority acknowl-
edged that there is nothing to prohibit "the legislative imposition of
neutral rules for access to public broadcasting."'" Therefore, avoiding
ad hoc/post hoc justifications would be best accomplished by "re-
quiring the controlling state agency to use (and adhere to) pre-
established, objective criteria." 82 On the other hand, the programmer
should not be encumbered by "a strictly mechanical approach to can-
didate selection."83 Identifying a criterion that satisfies these needs is
required.
1. Ballot Access Requirements
The states already use one possible objective criterion-the bal-
lot access requirement ("BAR").84 BARs are contained in statutes that
provide how many signatures are necessary to obtain a spot on the
ballot in the coming election. 85 In a peculiar way, this objective meas-
ure of political viability is akin to fetal viability. The meeting of a
BAR is evidence of an incipient candidate's quickening; it assures the
state that the candidacy is "alive and kicking." The candidate has
clearly attracted some public attention and, while the candidacy may
be "stillborn" at the ballot box, the candidate has at least shown that
79 See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) ("[The First Amendment]
has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political
office.").
'0 Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1645 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). But see Reply
Brief for the Petitioner, Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct, 1633 (1998),
available in Westlaw, 1997 WL 436243, at *16 (criticizing the FEC pre-established criteria rule
as given to disparate results "when applied according to the editorial judgments of different
broadcasters").
"' Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1640.82 1d. at 1649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83 Amicus Brief of Commission on Presidential Debates, Arkansas Educ. Television
Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998), available in Westlaw, 1997 WL 311466, at *4 (ar-
guing that debates will become overcrowded and subject to the risk of Republican and Demo-
cratic candidates opting not to participate).
84 See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n Network Found., 93 F.3d 497, 504
(8'h Cir. 1996).
85 Some states operate on a monetary fee basis to acquire ballot access, see, e.g., OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 5-112 (Vest 1997) ($750 for U.S. House, $1,000 for U.S. Senate).
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he will be worth carrying to term. In most states, the amount of sig-
natures necessary to qualify for the ballot is considerable.
8 6
The BAR certifies that the candidates before the voters are seri-
ous contenders.8 7 That the BARs are effective is seen in a comprehen-
sive overview, which shows that on the average, there is currently "no
more than one extra candidate per House district."88 Surely, this
would not result in the feared "cacophony of competing voices, none
of which could be clearly and predictably heard." 89
On the whole, it seems that the use of BARs alone could be a
sufficient, objective criterion to compel government-entity stations to
allow all qualified candidates into their public debates.9" Unfortu-
nately, strict adherence to them creates two primary difficulties:
passing the threshold may be so easy that the BAR is (1) merely a
sham, as in states with alarmingly low qualification thresholds, 91 and
(2) may result in an overabundance of candidates. 92 When this occurs,
the need for other standards to "ration or allocate the scarce resources
on some acceptable neutral principle" becomes imperative.93 These
reasons, more than anything, illustrate why some editorial discretion,
even for government employees, must be maintained.94 That is why
86 See generally Brian L. Porto, The Constitution and the Ballot Box: Supreme Court Ju-
risprudence and Ballot Access for Independent Candidates, 7 BYU J. PUB. LAW 281, 288
(1993) (offering a survey of the generally high BAR threshold in different states).
87 Amicus Brief for Perot '96, Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct.
1633 (1998), available in Westlaw, 1997 WL 361877, at *20 ("Ballot access laws are the state's
legitimate and objective way of screening out frivolous candidates and guaranteeing the seri-
ousness of candidates who achieve a place on the ballot.").
88 Id. at *4 (basing their finding on the last 25 general elections).
89 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969) (finding FCC regulations
under fairness doctrine enhance First Amendment freedoms).
90 This was the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that the Court reversed. The discussion herein
contemplates a statute propagating the objective criteria, which would not necessarily have to
be, and probably should not be, limited to the sole use of a BAR.
91 See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-359(l)(a), (c) (1990) (200 for House, 1,000 for
Senate); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-5-101(b)(1) (Michie 1994) (only 25 signatures needed to ballot
qualify for any office); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-9-502(2)(a)(i),(ii) (Michie 1995) (100 for
House, 300 for Senate).
92 Even states with high BAR thresholds may produce an unwieldy number of candidates
demanding debate access. In short, BARs offer "no obvious limiting principle." Amicus Brief of
FCC, Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998), available in West-
law, 1997 WL 311464, at *12. Due to the Eighth Circuit's ruling that BARs alone compelled
public stations to permit access to all qualified candidates caused the Nebraska Educational
Telecommunications Network to cancel its 1996 senatorial debate. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at
1643. If states wish to ensure that their BARs are producing serious candidates they can always
adjust the BAR to reflect a more objective measure of support. See id. at 1649 n.19 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that if Nebraska's public television programmers had pre-established, ob-
jective criteria they probably could have gone forward with the debate without fear of a law-
suit).
93 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995)
(determining university's denial of funds to religious group to be viewpoint discrimination).
94 Naturally, avoiding all trace of subjectivity is an impossibility.
[Vol. 49:257
AETC v. FORBES
other standards with objective criteria respective of editorial discre-
tion are needed in conjunction with BARs.
2. When the BAR Is No Bar: Other Objective Standards
One objective method is to examine the candidate's past elec-
toral support. A perennial candidate's consistent failure to garner
even the slightest hint of voter interest may constitute some evidence
of the candidate's insignificance, possibly enough to justify his exclu-
sion.9"
Polls may constitute another way to reveal whether the public is
interested in the candidate or his issues, and if the candidate has any
realistic chance of making an impact on the election.96 These, how-
ever, are fraught with uncertainty due to their unpredictability and
anticipatory nature.97 In addition, poll results are based on statistical
calculations, which are always open to suspicion.9"
A final possibility is to follow the New Jersey example of using
campaign financing as the yardstick for debate participation.99 A fed-
eral district court found the statute passed even the heightened scru-
tiny of the limited public forum doctrine.' 0 The sole drawback is that
Whenever the government is in the business of speech... the exercise
of editorial judgment is inescapable. If there is any political or ideological
resonance to the expressive activity involved, the good-faith exercise of that
judgment may have unavoidable political or ideological consequences; and so
(because they are unavoidable) these consequences do not condemn the judg-
ment.
Chicago Acorn v. Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority, 150 F.3d 605, 701 (7th
Cir. 1998) (holding that Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes did not grant government
capability to limit use of nonpublic pier's facilities on political grounds). The goal, therefore, is
to limit subjectivity as much as possible.
95 A notable example is the late Lar Daly. "Daly ran unsuccessfully for more than 40
elections until his death in 1978." See Fulani v. FCC, 49 F.3d 904,908 n.5 (2d Cir. 1995).
96 This should not be limited to whether or not the 6andidate can win. The power of an
independent to draw support away from a major party candidate may force that candidate to
confront important issues that he would rather not address.
97 See Amicus Brief of Perot '96, Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S.
Ct. 1633 (1998), available in Westiaw, 1997 WL 361877, at *15. Poll numbers tend to be eva-
nescent. A prime example of their dubious utility came in the 1992 Wisconsin race for the U.S.
Senate. Just three weeks prior to the Democratic primary a major poll showed the eventual
winner receivingjust 10% of the vote. See id. at *15-16.
98 A disturbing example of this occurred in 1992 when a poll showed that 1 in 5 Ameri-
cans doubted the Holocaust occurred. In 1994 the poll was redone and found that only 1 in 100
held this -view. The 1992 survey was based on a flawed question. See New Holocaust Poll:
Fewer Doubters, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, July 8, 1994, at A20, available in Westlaw, 1994
WL 4338570; see also Misuse of Statistics, SALT LAKE TRiBUNE, August 19, 1998, at A12,
available on Westlaw, 1998 WL 4068271 (reviewing statistical abuses by government); Sheri L.
Gronhoud, Note, Social Science Statistics in the Courtroom, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 688
(1987) (commenting on the misuse of statistics in the juridical setting).
99 See NJ. STAT. AN. § 19:44A-45 (West 1989).
1oo See Arons v. Donovan, 882 F. Supp. 379 (D.NJ. 1995) (finding the statute viewpoint-
neutral by operation of law).
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the law forces state-entity stations to accept all qualified candidates
for the debate. While it is an objective measure, it should not stand
alone for two reasons: it robs programmers of all editorial discretion
and it is classist.t °
Ultimately, the pre-established criteria should offer an objective
snapshot of where a candidate stands and whether, in the good faith
editorial judgment of the programmer, the candidate can be excluded
based on his failure to meet these standards.
C. Why Third-Party Inclusion is Essential
1. The Historical and Future Value of Third Parties
Third parties have bequeathed a multiplicity of benefits upon the
American polity and have always been in the vanguard of democratic
progress."' Direct election of senators, suffrage for women and the
graduated income tax were all initially espoused by independent par-
ties,103 as were regulation of the railways, higher civil service stan-
dards, the formation of labor unions and the promotion of populist
tools such as the initiative, the referendum and the recall.'0 4 Third
parties have also tended to advance nonviolent solutions for the radi-
cal, malcontented or potentially estranged. Ultimately, they deter the
two-party duopoly from irrevocably institutionalizing itself,0 5 which
would be an appalling devolution into the realm of Tweedledee and
101 See Amicus Brief of Natural Law Party, Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v.
Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998), available in Westlaw, 1997 WL 441289, at *12 ("[In 1994]
approximately 90% of Congressional races were won by the candidate who spent the most
money."). See generally Center for Responsive Politics (visited Sept. 30, 1998)
<http://www.crp.org/spend.htm> (providing general overview of the use of money in political
campaigns). This infelicitous disparity is most pronounced in areas of race and class. "Most
political donors live in white, upscale neighborhoods." Jim Drinkard, Money Talks, USA
TODAY, Sept. 24, 1998, at 8A (comparing federal campaign finance data with Census findings);
but see McGlynn v. New Jersey Public Broad. Auth., 88 NJ. 112, 125, 439 A.2d 54 (1981)
(commending the law as a positive instrumentality for placing candidates of limited means
before the public).
102 See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 251 (1957) ("All political ideas cannot
and should not be channeled into the programs of the two major parties. History has amply
proved the virtue of political activity by minority, dissident groups, who innumerable times have
been in the vanguard of democratic thought and whose programs were ultimately accepted.");
"Many of America's noblest and far-reaching advances in freedom were third-party proposals
years before the major parties touched them with even the longest pole." J.D. GILLESPIE,
POLITICS AT THE PERIPHERY: THIRD PARTIES IN TWO-PARTY AMERICA 24 (1993) (examining
the history of independent political parties in the U.S.).103 See STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE ET AL., THIRD PARTIES IN AMERICA 8 (2d ed. 1996).
104 See Keith Darren Eisner, Non-major Party Candidates and Televised Presidential De-
bates: the Merits of Legislative Inclusion, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 973, 983 (1993) (arguing for the
promulgation of laws promoting expanded debate opportunities for independent office-seekers).
1o5 See Amicus Brief of Pacific Legal Foundation, Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v.
Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998), available in Westlaw, 1997 WL 370055, at *6.
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Tweedledum politics that even the Supreme Court has counseled
against. 106
In the past two decades, independent political parties have ex-
panded their base of support. America's complacency with a two-
party system began to diminish in the early 1980s."7 By 1994, a ma-
jority supported the formation of a national third party. 8 In 1995, 6
in 10 Americans wanted a third party to run candidates at all levels of
government."0 9 Over 10% of U.S. voters cast their ballot for a third
party Presidential candidate in the 1996 election.' Third party can-
didates expand the political dialogue of America's diverse society,
often broach issues considered too controversial by the major party
candidates, act as "spoilers""' and occasionally win." 2 Simply put,
the people are clamoring for these catalysts of change." 3 With bur-
geoning heterogeneity in the U.S. population," 4 coupled with in-
creasing regionalism,"'5 third parties that speak for the many diver-
106 See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 802 (1983) ("iP]rotecting the Repub-
fican and Democratic Parties from external competition cannot justify the virtual exclusion of
other political aspirants from the political arena."); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)
("There is, of course, no reason why two parties should retain a permanent monopoly on the
right to have people vote for or against them.").
107 See Christian Collet, Trends: Third Parties and the Two-Party System, 60 PUBLIC
OPINION QUARTERLY 431,433 (1996) (examining public attitudes toward independent parties).
10 See id.
109 See Gallup Newsletter Archives, Vol. 60, No. 9, July 7, 1995.
110 See David Judson, Third-Party Movements-Any Livelier After Election Day? Gannett
News Service, Nov. 7, 1996, available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 4390273.
111 There is the distinct possibility that had Forbes been included in the debate he may
have shifted the outcome in the Democrats' favor. Forbes garnered 2.5% of the vote; the Re-
publican victor 50.2%. If Forbes had swayed just I in 15 GOP voters to vote for him, the
Democrat would have won. See Jamin Raskin, Let the Little Guy Have His Day on TV,
WASHINGTON TIMEs, October 8, 1997, at A19, available in Westlaw, 1997 WL 3685838.
112 Congress' only independent member, Bernard Sanders, began as a fringe-party candi-
date. See Candace Page, Bernard Sanders Has Added to Vermont's .... AP, June 28, 1997,
available in Westiaw, 1997 WL 2536270.
113 Eisner, supra note 104, at 985.
114 See generally, Tom Morganthau, The Face of the Future: Demographics, NEWSWEEK,
Jan. 27, 1997, at 58 (predicting a dystopian future for a non-white majority America divided by
class and race); Jonathon Tilove, White America: Ready to be a Minority?, DAILY SOUTHTOWN,
June, 29, 1998, at Al, A2 (forecasting a non-white majority in the United States by 2050).
15 See Robert D. Kaplan, Travels into America's Future, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, August
1998, at 37 (pinpointing multicultural diversity as the chief reason for growing regionalism
across the U.S. and Canada). Regionalism is often cited as one of the causes of the Civil War.
In the 1860 presidential election the Southern Democrats, Northern Democrats, Republicans and
Constitutional Unionists campaigned along geographical lines. "[A]ll results showed sectional
voting to some extent" E.B. LONG, THE CIvIL WAR DAY BY DAY 2-3 (1971); see also David
Judson, Third-Party Movements-Any Livelier After Election Day? Gannett News Service, Nov.
7, 1996, available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 4390273 (reporting that the last two presidential elec-
tions marked the first time since the Civil War era that third parties took over 10% of the na-
tional vote in successive presidential elections).
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gent voices in America may well enhance minority opportunities for
representation.116
2. Applying Leash Laws to the Gatekeepers
It is fundamental that the electorate have the greatest possible
exposure to each serious candidate in order to form an educated
opinion prior to voting.117 In modem America, it is well nigh impos-
sible to reach the constituency by wailing campaign slogans in the
public square. Access to television, the medium of communication
found in nearly every citizen's home,1 ' is critical. Aside from expen-
sive television advertising, televised candidate debates are an office-
seeker's primary means for reaching the masses. Privately owned
broadcasters must adhere to pre-established, objective criteria in de-
termining which candidates will participate in a debate.'19 Why
should public broadcasters-government employees-be permitted to
employ some amorphous, unrecorded set of standards in making the
same determination?
Debates are probably the single most decisive factor in how a
citizen casts his ballot. 2° With fully two-thirds of public television
stations state-licensed, 21 public broadcasting programmers are liter-
ally the gatekeepers that determine which candidates will be exposed
to the public via a debate. Thus, they need to be leashed legislatively;
albeit neither with a ductile cord nor a choker. A balance between
116 There is evidence to suggest that America's racial minorities would support a third
party more in tune with their needs. See, e.g., Tom Wicker, Deserting the Democrats: Why
African-Americans and the Poor Should Make Common Cause in Their Own Party, THE
NATION, June 17, 1996, at 11 (noting strong third-party sentiment from 46% of Blacks and 54%
of Hispanics polled in a national survey); Lenora Fulani, Blacks Need to Leave Dems, GOP
Behind, USA TODAY, Sept. 6, 1996, at 11A, available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 2067948 (pointing
out that fully 65% of young Blacks favor the formation of a third party).
17 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 346-47 (1995) ("In a re-
public where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices
among candidates for office is essential, for the identities of those who are elected will inevita-
bly shape the course that we follow as a nation."). AETC came to see the light in this regard.
For their 1998 debate for the Third Congressional District the network invited Ralph Forbes.
The Republican incumbent refused to participate, probably since there was no Democratic can-
didate. As a result, Forbes was granted, under an FCC regulation, ten minutes of airtime to
persuade Arkansas voters. See Reform Party Candidate Gets 10 Minutes on Air in Lieu of De-
bate, AP, Sept. 28, 1998, available in Westlaw, 1998 WL 7450311.
"l' As of 1995, 98.3% of all U.S. households owned a TV. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 1997 (117th ed.), Table 888 at 566.
"9 See 11 CFR § 110.13(c) (1997).
120 See Amicus Brief of Green Party, Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118
S. Ct. 1633 (1998), available in Westlaw, 1997 WL 367005, at *9 (citing 1988 and 1992 exit
polls that "showed that in presidential elections, more voters based their balloting decision on
the debates than on any other single factor").
121 See National Public Radio, Morning Edition, October 8, 1997, available in Westlaw,
1997 WL 12823467.
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allowing "excessive discretion!' to programmers and a scheme man-
dating "automatic inclusion" for candidates must be established.1"
The Court has long recognized the danger in allowing a gov-
ernment authority unchecked discretion, unless "bounded by precise
and dear standards."' 3 The state-entity station's decision in inviting
some candidates (inevitably those of the two major parties) and ex-
cluding others (typically everyone else) legitimizes the selected candi-
dates124 and relegates the uninvited to the barbaricum.1 5 On the out-
side looking in, third parties are robbed of their ability to influence
the electorate, hold the Republican/Democrat duopoly accountable,
or raise "untouchable" issues.1 6 Despite their ostensible designation
as journalists, public television programmers remain government
employees and, as such, "it can never be assumed that government
journalists are in an adversarial relationship with their employers." "lV
By providing a facile means to include the major party candidates
and rationalize the exclusion of independents, the government is, in
effect, imposing partisan preferences by entrenching the two-party
duopoly.1 Requiring programmers to adhere to the foregoing ob-
jective criteria will assure a fair opportunity for third party access to
debates, while also reserving a circumscribed degree of editorial dis-
cretion to the programmers.
CONCLUSION
The inherently fractious nature of multicultural diversity can not
be perpetually accommodated by a two-party system. Available evi-
22 Amicus Brief of Brennan Center for Justice, Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v.
Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998), available in Westlaw, 1997 WL 384770, at 4-5. The focus of
this Comment has been on statewide elections. In the case of local elections the BARs are far
easier to reach. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-7-103(d)(1) (Mihie 1993) (ten signatures re-
quired to rm for municipal office), IDAHO CODE § 34-708(2)(d) (Michie 1995) (five for county
office), KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 118-315(2) (West 1997) (two for city office). In those areas
local programmers may be swamped with potential debaters, therefore they should be given
more latitude in making exclusions. See Chandler v. Georgia Pub. Telecomm. Comm'n, 917
F.2d 486, 494 (11th Cir. 1990) (Clark, J, dissenting) (pointing out that were the state-entity
station flooded with candidates, it "would have a neutral and not viewpoint-based rationale for
not having all the candidates on the same debate panel at the same time"). Further, reaching the
electorate is much more manageable in a local contest.
123 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 US. 546,553 (1974) (holding that gov-
ernment owned auditorium was devoted to expressive activities).
124 Eisner, supra note 104, at 998.
125 In classical history, this included any area beyond the civilized confines of Imperial
Rome. RoROS1NSORsm 
, supra note 103, at 222.
27 Amicus Brief of Natural Law Party, Arkansas Educ. Television Comm 'n v. Forbes,
118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998), available in Westlaw, 1997 WL 441289, at *3.
'
28 "T]he right to vote is heavily burdened if that vote may be cast only for one of two
parties at a time when other parties are clamoring for a place on the ballot." American Party of
Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974) (holding that state practice of not including third
parties on absentee ballot denied equal protection).
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dence indicates that the disparate peoples of America want greater
electoral choice. 129 By adopting the reasonable, objective, viewpoint-
neutral standards proposed herein, the "safety valve" function of third
parties and the editorial function of public broadcast programmers can
be preserved consistent with the First Amendment, while still broad-
ening the electorate's choices.
SUTrroN I. KJNTER mt
129 See supra notes 107-116 and accompanying text.
t The author would like to thank his grandfather for raising him up in the ways that are
right. "Train up a child in the way he should go: and when he is old, he will not depart from it."
Proverbs 22:6
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